Political unrest in 2014 threatened Lesotho's newly found democratic stability. Observers focus on educating the public about the electoral system and encouraging pre-election coalition discussions. However, this analysis suggests this ignores the institutional influences of Lesotho's electoral system that undermine both public understanding and stability. Furthermore, a statistical analysis of district competition finds the 2015 elections to be largely consistent with previous elections, but that the percentage of rejected ballots correlates with a district victory for the largest party. Although this may simply be a statistical anomaly, the findings highlight structural challenges and reconsideration of electoral reforms.
Introduction
Lesotho gradually transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy in the 1990s (see Matlosa 2006) , after a history of dominant parties, coups and limited role for opposition voices (e.g. McCartney 1973; Gumbi 1995; Olaleye 2004; Cho and Bratton 2006) . Despite challenges in establishing democratic roots post-independence (Makoa 2004) , even in the absence of religious tension or ethnic divisions (e.g. Maundeni 2010), Lesotho saw relatively peaceful elections following reforms for a new electoral system in 2002. Lesotho currently employs a mixed member system which allocates seats to both single member districts (SMDs) as well as through proportional representation (PR) within the same legislative chamber. This reform to a mixed system in part intended to produce a more representative National Assembly (Elklit 2002) , by ensuring significant representation to the opposition. The shift marked the country's first free and fair election in 2002, despite protests by the opposition (Makoa 2004) , and the Independent Electoral Commission's (IEC) providing marginal means for domestic groups or international observers to challenge election results (Makoa 2004) . Nevertheless, institutional reforms appeared to signal the beginning of democratic consolidation, reflected in the elections of 2007 and 2012 (Rich et al 2014) , the latter seen as the best political climate since democratization efforts in the early 1990s (Letsie 2013 ).
However, political instability in 2014, which culminated in an attempted coup d'état and intervention by external third-party mediators, led to an early election for February 2015 that may have undermined popular faith in whether the electoral system could yield stable governing coalitions. Furthermore, whether this electoral system could promote long-term stability in the country in no small part rests on popular perception of the electoral system as fair. In this vein, the Commonwealth Special Envoy's report on Lesotho-completed just prior to the crisis-calls for two additional measures to deepen democracy: first, making citizens' aware of the workings of the electoral system, specifically how votes affect electoral outcomes and the subsequent process of government formation; and, second, parties considering pre-election coalitions and explaining this to voters (Prasad, 2014) . However, the recommendations neither suggested changes to Lesotho's lack of formal thresholds for the PR seats, nor the legal requirement under Section 82(1)(b) of the constitution, which requires the National Assembly to form a government within 14 days of the general election.
Although a vast literature on mixed legislative systems has emerged since 1990, few of these works address their impact in countries with limited democratic roots, especially those which were not formerly communist. In addition, Lesotho is rarely included in cross-national analyses of mixed systems, although a cursory evaluation suggests that Lesotho's electoral institutional context does not make it an outlier among the broader population of cases. 1 Furthermore, little work on mixed systems attempts to tie this literature to the growing research on electoral fraud. Considering the added complexity of mixed systems and the general public ignorance of how votes translate into seats in this context, this provides the potential for at least the perception of fraud. The research presented here suggests that the Commonwealth Special Envoy, while well intentioned, may be overlooking areas in which Lesotho's electoral institutions and electoral administration undermines citizens' confidence in the electoral process' fairness and ability to deliver political stability.
The format of this analysis is as follows. First, a brief summary of mixed member systems and Lesotho's institutional framework is presented. This is followed by a summary of the 2014 political crisis and subsequent election. After a brief comparison of 2015 district competition to previous elections, empirical analysis of district victories for the Democratic Congress uncovers a correlation between victory and the percent of rejected ballots. While not a smoking gun, and additional evidence suggests the actual substantive effect is negligible, such a correlation may be cause for concern within the unstable Lesotho context. In conclusion, additional suggestions regarding means to encourage democratic stability in Lesotho are presented.
Mixed Member Systems and Lesotho
The literature on mixed systems builds upon Duverger's Law (Duverger 1954) and its expectation of two-party competition in single member districts (SMDs) and multiparty competition under proportional representation (PR). Proponents of mixed member systems expected the two seat types to operate as if independent from one another (e.g. Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Moser and Scheiner 2004) , with constituency focus in two-party dominated district races and national policy in multiparty races for PR seats. Others argued that the simple existence of two electoral rules within the same chamber created a form of contamination and thus Duverger's Law should not hold (e.g. Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005 ).
Lesotho enacted a mixed system in no small part due to the one-party dominance under a single member district system (e.g. Matlosa 1999; Molomo 1999 ). Lesotho's type of mixed system is more consistent with the contamination thesis. First, as a mixed member proportional (MMP), the electoral system requires the overall distribution of seats to be proportional. Such systems, also including Germany and New Zealand, contrast with mixed member majoritarian (MMM), where the results of district competition do not influence the distribution of PR seats. 2 Secondly, Lesotho uses a single ballot rather than the more common two-ballot system. Here, much like Mexico, voters choose a district candidate and these district votes are then aggregated to allocate PR seats. Voters do not directly vote for PR seats and thus cannot split their votes between SMD and PR tiers. Thus supporters of smaller parties must vote for non-viable district candidates to potentially win PR seats. Similarly parties must run non-viable district candidates to be eligible for PR seats. Furthermore, the literature on MMP systems, one which potentially informed the decision to enact such as system in Lesotho, rests largely on evidence from Germany and New Zealand, two stable democracies. Meanwhile, little literature directly tackles the role of a single ballot mixed system, with few countries (notably Albania and South Korea) having experience under both one and two-ballot forms. Thus, while the complexities of twovote MMP systems are believed to discourage strategic voting (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2005) , the one-vote system potentially exacerbates the practice. In conclusion, the electoral turnout was low, approximately 47 percent, while the margin of victory in popular votes was thin: the DC having acquired 3,551 votes more than the ABC, or less than one percent of the over half million votes cast. However, Dimpho Motsamai, an expert based at the Institute for Security Studies at Pretoria, posits that political leaders not the MMP electoral institutions were responsible for the democratic election: in fact, the electoral institutions prevented the one-party dominance that repeatedly caused political violence under the old system (Allison 2015) . While one-party dominance was again avoided by the MMP system, the electoral format did little to manufacture a stable majority. Nor does the electoral format encourage public understanding of how the two electoral seats interact, a common concern among mixed systems.
Empirical Analysis
How do the 2015 elections compare to both theoretical expectations on mixed systems and maintaining democratic goals, particularly democratic stability, in Lesotho? Table 1 The necessity for a coalition government following the 2015 election, when parties had ill prepared for such an outcome, is common outcome among MMP systems and thus should not have been a surprise. After all, this was also the outcome in 2007, when the DC won a plurality of seats (48 out of 120), yet ultimate became the main opposition to an ABC-led ruling coalition.
In contrast, in 2015, the DC ultimately coordinated with the Lesotho Congress for Democracy and five other parties to cobble together a majority. While this may meet the short-term needs of a minimal winning coalition, it also allows for smaller parties to essentially blackmail larger parties for greater concessions or risk a change in power. Thus, while promoting multiparty competition in one aspect intended to create stability, in terms of governability, this may be a hindrance.
Since Lesotho uses a one-vote system and districts outnumber PR seats, an examination of district competition is warranted. The average vote concentration among the top two district candidates of 77.66% of the vote is consistent with the contamination thesis. This was not dissimilar from the last three elections (2002, 2007, 2012) Nevertheless, the relative parity of district victories by the DC and ABC suggest the continuance of two-party dominant competition rather than a return of single party domination. We replicate these findings for 2015 with separate tests of the reported number of registered voters, total voters, and the number of votes rejected (Table 3) . However, none of the digits were beyond one standard deviation below or above the mean, with only one section (the reported number of district registered voters ending in a six) coming close to two standard deviations, thus providing no clear evidence of fraud. Thus, much like 2012, the evidence suggests that vote tallies were not manipulated after the fact. As a second measure, we analyzed rates of the total ballots that were rejected, which ranges from 0.32 percent to 3.77 percent of all votes and with a mean 1.37 percent. While many reasons may emerge as to why ballots were rejected, a systematic pattern in favor of a party would at the very least justify a closer investigation of the election results. Table 4 presents three logit models with the dependent variable whether or not the district elected a DC candidate.
Model 1 includes only one independent variable: the percentage of total ballots that were rejected.
Here Since logit models are non-linear, predicted probabilities provide additional insight.
Using Model 1, the predicted probability of a DC district victory ranges from 6.3% at the rejected minimum of 0.32 percent of ballots up to 99.63% at the reject maximum at 3.77 percent.
Predicted probabilities from Model 2 (holding all other variables at their mean) produce similar results. A district victory by the DC is predicted at only 4.66% where rejected votes as a share of total votes are at their minimum, compared to 99.63% at their max. Finally, Model 3 sees a similar effect: 9.37% at the minimum and 95.67% at the maximum.
While these results may suggest an effort to reject ballots for partisan purposes, a closer analysis finds no smoking gun. In particular, the percentage of rejected ballots only exceeded the margin of victory in one district race by a little more than one percent: Constituency 10 in Leribe.
Nor did this district elect a DC candidate, but rather an ABC candidate. Thus, if the rejection of ballots were intended to sway elections in favor of the DC, the results here suggest that the efforts were ineffective and unnecessary.
What This Means for Lesotho
The results of the 2015 election may provide relief in terms of maintaining competitive elections, but the findings here suggest considerable room for reform. First, public education efforts to boost understanding of the electoral system are certainly a welcome addition. However, this ignores what to a certain extent are predictable concerns under a one-vote MMP system. The system neither encourages easy comprehension of how votes translate into seats nor does it encourage stable ruling coalitions. In the quest to avoid the dummy lists of a two vote MMP system, Lesotho simply discarded the second ballot, rather than consider means in which a twovote system may have been advantageous, either as an MMM system or with rigid requirements that parties slate candidates in both tiers.
Secondly, while greater attention to publicizing pre-election coalitions will likely encourage a greater link between voter expectations and outcomes, such efforts will be undermined if the perceptions of the electoral process remained tarnished. The empirical analysis here suggests a consistent correlation between rejected ballots and a DC victory Although this pattern may simply be a statistical artifact rather than intentional electoral manipulation, the presence of such patterns may be cause for alarm among electoral losers. After all, the stability of democratic systems relies on parties not only losing elections (Przeworski 1991) , but electoral losers consenting to those losses (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005) . Thus, greater effort to uncover the reasons behind rejected ballots and education efforts to limit wasted ballots should assist in building confidence in the electoral institutions.
However, the political parties' mutual distrust-evidenced during the crisis of 2014-could impede their leaders from undertaking the institutional changes suggested here; because the fragile post-electoral equilibrium perhaps exists partially due to the parties' acceptance of extant electoral rules. Consequently, third-parties, whether specific countries or regional and international organizations, need to act as mediators between these political leaders to consensually make the suggested changes in the electoral rules. Mediators can alleviate distrust by increasing communication between political leaders and set the agenda centered on the changes suggested by this paper (Beardsley et al. 2006) . Such methods would reduce the need for expensive military interventions to suppress conflicts and, more importantly, the unwarranted loss of life and assets that necessitates them.
1 Using the data from Rich (2015) that covers most district elections in mixed systems from 1990-2012, we reran his original models which control for institutional variations within mixed systems and added a dummy variable for Lesotho. This addition never reached statistical significance, suggesting that the country's district level results are not outliers among the family of mixed systems. 2 Under MMM, the total results may be very disproportional if one party wins more district seats than their PR vote share. Under MMP, party list seats are allocated only after adjusting for district victories.
